During a widely publicized interview at a tech conference in the summer of 2023, Linda Yaccarino calmly argued that X was a platform that advertisers could rely on. She had only been working there for a few weeks. According to most accounts, she was a seasoned media executive with real connections throughout the advertising industry. Elon Musk had likely hired her specifically because she was familiar with the brands he had been alienating and could potentially win them back. She discussed engagement metrics and brand safety tools with assurance. She grinned broadly. Musk was probably using his phone somewhere offstage.
In November 2023, five months later, Musk posted on his own platform endorsing an antisemitic conspiracy theory. Apple stopped running advertisements. Disney took a break. IBM stopped. According to internal X sales documents that The New York Times was able to view, Airbnb, Coca-Cola, and Microsoft had either stopped their campaigns or were in grave danger of doing so. That internal watch list included over 200 advertising units from large corporations. That month alone was expected to result in a revenue loss of up to $75 million. Advertising revenue had already dropped by more than half from pre-acquisition levels in the first year of Musk’s ownership.
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Acquisition | Elon Musk acquired Twitter (now X) in October 2022 for approximately $44 billion; rebranded the platform and restructured its content moderation policies |
| Ad Revenue Collapse | Within one year of Musk’s acquisition, advertising revenue had fallen by more than half; X’s estimated ad revenue dropped a further $238 million in 2024; UK revenues dropped nearly 60% in a single year by January 2026 |
| November 2023 Trigger | Musk endorsed an antisemitic conspiracy theory on the platform — prompting immediate ad suspensions from Apple, Disney, IBM, Airbnb, Coca-Cola, Microsoft, and more than 200 other ad units listed in internal X sales documents |
| Projected Revenue Loss (2023) | X faced potential losses of up to $75 million in advertising revenue by end of 2023, per internal documents viewed by The New York Times |
| Marketer Trust in Brand Safety | Only 4% of marketers believe X provides adequate brand safety — compared to 39% for Google (highest-ranked); Kantar’s 2024 survey of 1,000 senior marketing executives globally |
| Planned Advertiser Pullback | Approximately 26% of advertisers planned to cut spending on X in the following year — the biggest recorded pullback from any top ad platform, according to Kantar research |
| Brand Safety Failures | World Bank ceased all paid advertising after CBS News found its ads appearing under racist and neo-Nazi posts; a political campaign’s ads appeared under antisemitic content despite “limited” brand safety settings being enabled |
| X’s Legal Response | X filed an antitrust lawsuit against a group of advertisers alleging coordinated boycott; the lawsuit was dismissed by a US court in March 2026 |
| X’s Official Position | X claims a 99% brand safety rate validated by DoubleVerify and Integral Ad Science; asserts the majority of advertisers are increasing investment — a claim that conflicts directly with Kantar’s independent research |
| CEO During Crisis | Linda Yaccarino appointed CEO June 2023, inheriting falling ad revenue; tasked with rebuilding advertiser relationships while Musk continued posting and owning the platform |
| Top Competing Platforms | Marketers’ preferred ad platforms: YouTube (top for brand safety); consumers favor Amazon ads (relevant/useful) and TikTok (entertaining) — X ranks poorly on both trust and consumer preference metrics |
| Survival Mechanism | X has pursued subscription revenue (X Premium), small/mid-size advertiser targeting, political ad revenue, and Musk’s personal financial backing — none fully replacing lost major brand ad spend |
Since then, there has been no discernible improvement in the numbers. X’s projected ad revenue fell by an additional $238 million by 2024. By January 2026, UK revenues had dropped by almost 60% in a single year. Just 4% of senior marketing executives worldwide, according to a Kantar survey, think X offers sufficient brand safety, compared to 39% for Google, which comes in first. According to Kantar, about 25% of advertisers surveyed said they intended to further reduce their spending on X, which is the biggest withdrawal from any major advertising platform. “The largest recorded pullback from any top advertising platform” is the kind of superlative that, when applied to any other business, would spark a serious discussion about long-term viability.
Observing all of this build up gives the impression that X is not entirely subject to the standard regulations of media companies that rely on advertising. By now, a traditional social media company would have either completely restructured or started to wind down operations if it didn’t have a billionaire owner who could personally absorb losses and whose political proximity to power structures creates its own form of leverage. X hasn’t either.
Instead, it has adopted a tactic that is hard to describe in a positive light: it filed an antitrust lawsuit against the departing advertisers, claiming a coordinated boycott in violation of competition law. In March 2026, a US court dismissed the lawsuit. Meanwhile, X persisted in asserting a 99 percent brand safety rate as confirmed by independent companies, a figure that stands in stark contrast to independent data demonstrating that major brands’ advertisements were showing up beneath neo-Nazi content and antisemitic posts while those brands’ safety settings were ostensibly set to their most restrictive configurations.
After CBS News revealed that its advertisements were showing up beneath a racist post from an account that frequently published white nationalist content, the World Bank stopped all paid advertising on X. After their advertisements appeared under antisemitic posts, a congressional campaign withdrew them. The director of communications for the campaign stated that they had chosen the safest brand safety setting that X provides. “Clearly,” he replied, “this brand safety tool is not working.” These are not edge cases from unidentified sponsors. These are organizations whose whole marketing strategy is based on linking their name to things they wish to be associated with.
A number of factors unrelated to advertising recovery have kept X running. A floor under the platform that no ad-revenue model could otherwise support is provided by Musk’s own financial position, which is enormous, diverse, and partially funded by his other endeavors. X Premium, a subscription service, has made some money, but not nearly enough to take the place of significant brand advertising. Regardless of what the brand safety data indicates, there is also the political component, which is genuinely hard to measure: Musk’s closeness to power in some political contexts has led to a perception in some business circles that X carries influence worth keeping access to.
It’s difficult to ignore the fact that the antitrust lawsuit against advertisers, which was eventually dropped, was, in some respects, the most illuminating thing X has done during this whole time. It was an attempt to use legal pressure to undo a market result: companies making logical choices about where their advertising budgets generate value and whether or not they have control over where their names appear.
The court rejected the idea that this violated antitrust laws. Most of the brands have not come back. It’s still unclear if X has a strategy that doesn’t rely on either enduring the criticism or placing a wager that political shifts will make brand safety issues seem less pressing. Specifically, neither is a business model. However, the platform is still operational. It is still genuinely unclear why and for how long.
